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IN THE SUP'REME COURT
OF T'HE ST'A TE o~F UTAH

ARCH

J)~\~[

CONSTRUCTORS,

P etitvonevr,
-vs.STATE TAX
UTAH,

Case No. 9384

COM~liSSION

OF

Respondent.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER
NATlJRE OF THE CASE
This is an original proceeding brought under Rule
65 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to revie'v
the action of the State Tax Commission under is its Decision No. 190. The petitioner Arch Dam Constructors
is using an access road in connection with the construction of thP Flaming Gorge Dam. Petitioner contends
that the aeress road is not a "'highvva)r" 'vithin the Ineaning of Section -!1-1-19, r~.C.A. 1953, and that it is not
required, therefore, to pay registration and license fees
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

on vehicles using the road. The respondent State Tax
Commission, by its Decision 190, held that the access
road ;is a "highway'', "'~ithin- the 1neaning of that section,
and that the petitioner must pay the registration and
license fees,._. The only question to be det~rn1ined by this
court, therefore, is whether the access road is a "highway" \vithin the meaning of the statute.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts were stipulated by counsel and are not in
dispute. The stipulation \vas recited in full by the Commission in its decision. It is not voluminous, and to make
the same readily available to the Court, \Ve quote the findings in full :
"1. The Arch Dam Construetors, a joint venture engaged in construction of Flaming Gorge
Dam, use an access road in the vicinity of the
Fla:q1ing Gorge Dam!site for purposesjncident to
the · construction of Flaming Gorge Dam. The
construction of the dan1 is being accomplished by
the Arch Da1n Constructors pursuant to a contract
with the United States of America, Department of
the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation.
"2. The access road used by the Arch Dam
·Constructors originates approximately 2,000 feet
north of the Utah border in the State of Wyoming,
at a junction \Yith ''Tyo1ning State Highway No.
530, and fron1 that point extends in a general
southeasterlY direction to the town of Dutch John,
Daggett Co~nty, Utah, and fron1 thence to the
Flaming Gorge Dam site, having an entire length
of 17.1Iniles. Certain vehicles owned by the Arch
Dam Constructors use the entire length of the access road as above mentioned for the purpose of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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transporting materials, supplies and personnel,
but the primary use of the aeeess road is from the
aggregate plant, located four miles south of the
lTtah state line, for the purpose of hauling aggregate from that plant to the Flaming Gorge Dam
site.
"3. Construction of the access road was cornrnenced by the Bureau of Reclamation pursuant
to a contract with the W angsgaard Construction
(~ompany of Logan, Utah, whereby the grading
and gravel surfacing of the portion of the road
from the Utah-Wyoming border to Dutch John
was completed. That contract also included construction of a timber bridge across the Green
River, and asphalt surfacing of about eight miles
of the access road from Dutch John toward the
Utah-Wyoming line. The Arch Dan1 Constructors
completed the asphalt surfacing pursuant to its
contract with the United States, from the point
where Wangsgaard ended its asphalt surfacing to
the Utah-Wyoming state line, also being a distance of approximately eight miles. The Arch
Dam ·Constructors have now spent approximately
$1,130,000 in constructing, and approximately
$81,000 in maintaining the access road, and are
spending approximately $1,800 per month maintaining the access road.
"4. The population of Dutch John is expected to reach 2,500 persons at the peak of construction, according to an estimate by the Bureau
of Reclamation, but the maximum population thus
far has been only 780 persons and the Arch Dam
Constructors estiinate that the maximum population "'"i 11 not exceed 1,300 peTsons at the peak of
construction.
"5. The access road serves as a connecting
link between \;r ernal and ~f anila, although 1Ttah
IIigh,vay -t--1- (not travPrsing the access road), adSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mittedly a public highway, also connects those two
Utah communities.
"6. The access road crosses land owned and
withdrawn or reserved by the United States of
America, since part of the road crosses sections
of the Ashley National Forest and the remainder
crosses land \vithdrawn by the Bureau of Reclamation for purposes related to the construction of
the Flaming Gorge Dam and Power Plant.
"7. The Contract between the Arch Dam
Constructors and the United States of America
requires the cotractor to keep the access road open
for general public use:
'The road [access] is the only adequate
connection bet,veen the Flaming Gorge community and the nearest established communities, and the contractor's use of the road shall
not infringe on or imperil the free public
use of the road for normal travel purposes.'
"8. Paragraphs 50 and 51 of the same contract oblige the contractor to maintain necessary
barricades, lights, danger signals and signs on the
access road for the safety of the public.
"9. In 1958 the Bureau of Reclamation requested the State High,Yay Patrol to take jurisdiction of the access road for the administration and
enforcement of state higlnYay la\YS and regulations on the aeeess road for the benefit and protection of the general public using the access road.
The State High\\Tay Patrol consented to undertake
such administration and enforcement, and a High\vay Patrnhnan has been assigned to the area.
~' 10.

In constructing the access road, Utah
State engineers made available striping equipSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ment and consulted with engineers for the l~ureau
of Reclarnation (but did not consult with or supply
any equipment to the Arch Dain ·Constructors),
such consultation being for the purpose of insuring that the access road would be properly marked,
signed, striped and zoned for speed in accordance
with the safety standards of the State of Utah;
all of which was to insure safe driving to those
using the access road and to assist in the investigation and reporting of accidents occuring on
the road. The primary use of the access road is
by personnel ernployed by the Arch Dam Constructors and by the Bureau of Reclantation, although the road is open to general public use.

"11. The State Road Commission asserted
jurisdiction over the access road and demanded
compliance 'vi th statutory restrictions as to size,
weight, and load limitations which are applicable
to the highways of the State of Utah. Pursuant
to said demand, on l\Iay 25, 1960, the Arch Dam
Constructors applied to the Road Commission for
the issuance of a special over-weight permit in
connection "··i th the use of their vehicles on the
Flarning Gorge access road. That request was
granted. The application for such permit by the
Arch Darn Constructors 'vas not an acknowledgernent by then1 of the State Road Commission's authority over the road, but was for the purpose of
complying with the requirements of the Road
Commission and thus insuring continued construction at the dam site, until such time as Arch Dam
Constructors could secure a legal determination
of the status of the access road.
''12. The lTnited States Bureau of Reclamation has indicated that it intends to permit the
public to use the road until 1962 or 1963, when
certain portions of the access road "Till l }r inundated as a result of impounding "rater behind
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Flaming Gorge Dam. The access road has now
been used by the general public for approximately
three years.
"13. The access road is maintained in all
respects at the expense of the Arch Dam Constructors, pursuant to its contract with the United
States, and no part of the access road was constructed by the State of Utah or any political
subdivision thereof, and no part of the access road
is being maintained by the State of lTtah or any
political subdivision thereof.
"14. There has been no official dedication of
the access road as a public highway by any official
act of the State of lJtah or any political subdivision thereof; nor has there been any official dedication of the access road as a public highway
by the lfnited States of America or any agency
or subdivision thereof; nor has there been any
official grant or conveyance of any highway or
right of way from the United States or any of its
agencies or politic-al subdivisions to the State of
Ut-ah or any of its political subdivisions.
"15. The State Tax Commission has notified
the Arch Dam ~Constructors that they are liable
for registration and license fees by virtue of Section 41-1-19, lT.C.A. 1953, on all of their vehicles
using the access road, and the Arch Dam Constructors have paid the appropriate registration
and license fees under protest and have brought
the instant action to restrain and enjoin the Tax
Commission from rollecting such registration and
license fees."
STATEl\1:ENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
SECTION 41-1-19 IMPOSES REGISTRATION AND LICENSE FEES ONLY WHEN VEHICLES ARE USED UPON
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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HIGH\VAYS WHICH ARE (a) MAINTAINED AT PUBLIC
EXPENSE, AND (b) OPEN TO THE PUBLIC AS A MA'TTER
OF RIGHT.
POINT II.
THE ACCESS ROAD IS NOT MAINTAINED AT PUBLIC
EXPENSE.
POINT III.
THE ACCESS ROAD IS NOT OPEN TO THE PUBLIC
AS A MATTER OF RIGHT.
(a) In Federal Lands, the Power of Congress is Exclusive
and only through its Exercise in some Form can Rights Therein
be Acquired.
(b) Section 525, Title 16, U .S.C., Concerning Rights-ofWay for Roads on N aional Forest Lands has not been Complied
With.
(c) There has been no Establishment of a Right in the
Public to use the Road under Authority of Section 932 , Title 43,

u.s.c.

(d) The Contract Executed by the Bureau of Reclamation
with Petitioner did not have the Effect of Granting to the Public
Rights in Federal Land.
(e) Even if the Utah Statutes Defining Public Roads and
Private Roads were Applicable to Federal Land, this would not
be a Public Road within the Utah statutes.
POINT IV.
TAX STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST
THE STATE AND IN FAVOR OF THE TAXPAYER.
_A_RGU~Ir~~·JT

POINT I.
SECTION 41-1-19 Il\IPOSES REGISTRATION AND LICENSE FEES ONLY WHEN VEHICLES ARE USED UPON
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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HIGHWAYS WHICH ARE (a) MAINTAINED AT PUBLIC
EXPE~TSE, AND (b) OPEN TO THE PUBLIC AS A MA'TTER
OF RIGHT.

Beyond dispute is the fact that not all roads are
public highways and not all vehicles need to be registered
and licensed. The problem in the instant case is simply
one of determining which roads are exempt from the prOvisions of Section 41-1-19, which provides:
"Every n1otor vehicle, combination of vehicles, trailer and semi . .trailer, when driven or
moved upon a highway, shall be subject to registration and certificate of title provisions of this
act. . . . " (Emphasis added.)
The definitions of terms used in Chapter 1, Title 41,
are found in Section 1, where highway is defined as:
"The entire width between the property lines
of every way or place of whatever nature or any
part thereof open to the public as a matter of right
for purposes of vehicular traffic." Section 41-1-1
(bb). (En1phasis added.)
Thus, by specific statutory derlaration, a "'highway"
for the purpose of in1posing registration and license fees
means a high\Yay open to the public as a matter of right.
The meaning of the phrase "as a 1natter of right" presents no ambiguity. It sin1ply means that the general
public must use thP road as a matter of legal right
against the owner of the land. If the O"\\ller cannot legally
enjoin the general public fron1 using the road, then the
public uses the road as a matter of right, and the road
is a highway within the meaning of Section 41-1-19. Conversely, if t hP owner of the land can legally enjoin the

8
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general public from using the road, then the public does
not use the road as a matter of right, and the road is not
a highway within the meaning of Section -± l-1-19:
"It is quite true, as suggested by the Attorney
General, that a road or crossing may be public,
although it is and can be used by a few persons
only. It is, however, also true that under such
ci rcu nzstances any one who has occasion to use the
cross£ng can successfully complain of its obstruction and can require it to be kept open for passage .
. . ." Ba1nberger El. R. Co. v. P. U. Comm., 59
Utah 351, 362, 204 Pac. 314 (1922).
Accord: J/ orris v. Bluut, 49 lTtah :2-1:3, 161 Pac. 1127
(1916).
The definition of this court is in har1nony \Yith consistent pronouncements of other jurisdictions. American
Jurisprudence, , . ol. 25, Higlr\vays, SPction 136, presents
this summary :
"As already intimated, the rights and title of
an abutting o'vner who owns the fee to the land
over which a highway runs are subject and subordinate to the easement and servitude in favor of
the public. While he, in common with other abutting owners, may under certain circumstances
temporarily obstruct the highway when reasonably necessary, he has no right to do anything
in respect to it which will impair the safety of
traveler:-;, or in any "'"ay interfere with the use of
the way as a highway by the public, or to use it for
any purpose 'vhich amounts to a perversion of it
from the uses for which it was intended."
This court has added a clarification hy stating that
Hhigh,Yay," a~ used in Seet1on -±1-l-19 1:1eans "public
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
high,vay.''
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"Be it noted that the Section 41-1-19 did not
apply to all vehicles, but only those required to be
registered. By Section 19, before a motor vehicle
can be driven on a public highway, it must be
registered." Jackson v. James, 97 Utah 41, 89 P.
2d 235 (1939). (Emphasis added.)
In perceiving no difference in meaning between
"highway" and "public highway," this court finds support in a succinct statement in Black's Law Dictionary,
(Fourth Ed., 1951), Highway, page 862:
"It has been said that if the word 'highway'
is given its customary meaning, the phrase 'public highway' is an example of tautology - the
needless or useless repetition of the same idea,
of which the law seems to furnish so many illustrations. See Galloway v. Wyatt l\Ietal & Boiler
Works, 181 So. 187 189 La. 837; Blashfield, Cyc.
of Automobile Law and Pract., Perm. Ed., Section 3."
We believe that the above authorities establish that
a "high"ray" \Yithin the meaning of Section -±1-1-19,
U.C.A. (1953) is a road \vhich is open to the general public under such conditions that if the O\\rner of the fee were
to try to close or obstruct the road, the public could successfully complain and require the owner to reopen it since only then is the use by the public "as a matter of
right."
Where a road is con1pleted and n1aintained at public
expense, it generally \Yill be held to be a public higlnYay,
and, conversely, \\'"here it is not maintained at public expense, this is a strong indicia that it is not a high,vay
within the meaning of the statute. The lJtah statute does
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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not expressly say so, but the iu1plieation is ~o clear as to
leave littlP roorn for doubt. Not only did the Legislature
contemplate financing the construction and n1aintenan(·e
of highways 'vith public funds, but expressly provided
that receipts from registration and license fees should
be used for such purpose. C~hapter 8 of Title 27 deals with
the classification, construction and maintenance of high\vays. Chapter 2 of Title 27 (Sections 17 and 18) provides
for maintenance of Class B and Class ·C roads from the
motor vehicle registration fund. Chapter 4 of Title 27
(Sections 1 and 2) provides for the payment of interest
on bonds and the creation of a rede1nption fund for bonds
from the motor vehicle registration fund. Indeed, it goes
'vithout saying, for it is eom1non knowledge, that public
highways should be publicly maintained.
This, again, is in con1plete accord with ''hornbook"
defini.tions of "highways'' :
~' [The

prime essentials of a highway] are the
right of common enjoyment on the one hand and
the duty of public mai11tenance on the other.'
Am. Jur., Volume 25, Highways, Section 2. (Emphasis added.)
"[A highway is] a way open to the public at
large without distinction, discrimination, or restriction, except such as is incident to regulations
calculated to secure to the general public the
largest practical benefit therefrom and enjoyment thereof. Its prime essentials are the right
of common enjoyment on the one hand, an.d the
duty of pul)li:c nraintenance on the other. The term
is generic, and includes all public roads and ways."
Balleutine, La''r Dictionary (1948 Ed.), Highway,
page 587. (Emphasis added.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"[A highway is] an easement acquired by the
public in the use of a road or way for thoroughfare. Bolender. v. Southern Michigan Telephone
·Co., 182 Mich. 646, 148 N.W. 697, 700. A free and
public roadway, or street; one which every person
has the right to use. Abbott v. Duluth, C. C. Minn.,
104 F. 837. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Bennett, C:C.A.
r,riss., 296 F. 436, 437. Its prime essentials are
the right of common enjoyment on the one hand
and the duty of pttblic maintenance on the other.
Hildebrand v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 219 N.C. 402, 14 S.E. 2d 252, 25-1, 255."
Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth Ed., 1951), Highway, Page 862. (Emphasis added.)
It is, therefore, submitted that Section -±1-1-19 imposes registration and license fees only 'vhen vehicles
are used on a road 'vhich is 1naintained at public expense
and used by the general public as a matter of right.

POINT II.
THE ACCESS ROAD IS NOT MAINTAINED AT PUBLIC
EXPENSE.

There, of course, can be no factual issue concerning
the fact that this access road is not maintained by the
State of 1Ttah, for the parties have stipulated that:
"The access road is 1naintained in all respects
at the 0xpense of the ~\rrh Dan1 ,Constructors
(petition(lr), pursuant to its ron tract 'Yith the
United States, and no part of the access road 'vas
constructed by the State of Utah or any political
subdivision thereof, and no part of the arress road
is being 1naintained by the State of Utah or any
political subdivision thereof." (Para. 13, Findings
of Fact.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Arch Dam Constructors (petitioner) have now spent approximately $1,130,000.00 in
constructing, and approxin1ately $81,000.00 in
maintaining the access road, and are spending approximately $1,800.00 per month maintaining the
access road." (Para. 3, Finding of Fact.)
H •••

~ince

vehicle registration and license fees have been
in1posed to construct and maintain public highways, and
since this highway is not maintained by the State of Utah,
vehicles used upon it should not be subject to registration
and license fees.
POINT III.
THE ACCESS ROAD IS NOT OPEN TO THE PUBLIC
AS A MATTER OF RIGHT.
(a) In Federal Lands, the Power of Congress is Exclusive
and only through its Exercise in some Form can Rights Therein
be Acquired.

It is admitted that the public is presently using the
access road. But, of course, that is not the question.
The question is whether such use can be sustained as a
matter of right against the owner of the land.
It is of primary importance to a de1termination of
\Vhether the public is using this access road "as a matter
of right'' to keep in mind the fact that the road is located
upon federally o"\vned lands. It is equally important to
note that all of the lands are 'vithdra""'n or reserved by
the lTnited States of America for public use. Part of the
access road eross()~ sections of the Ashle~., ~ n tional
Forest and the remainder erosses lands ""'i~thdraw"n by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the Bureau of Reclamation. The parties have stipulated
as follows : ·
"The access road crosses land owned and
withdrawn or reserved by the United States of
America, since part of the road crosses sections
of the Ashley National Forest and the remainder
crosses land withdra,vn by the Bureau of Reclamation for purposes related to the construction of
the Flaming Gorge Dam and Power Plant." (Paragraph 6 of the Findings.)
The fact that the land traversed by the road is federall.Y. owned, and the further fact that the land is withdrawn or reserved for public use are of critical importance to the issue here to be determined, because rights
against the federal government can only be acquired
through a compliance with some act of Congress. In other
words, under the property clause (Article IV, Section 3,
Clause 2) of the United States Constitution, the power
to control and dispose of federal land is vested in Congress, and its power to grant or withhold rights in federal
land is almost \\rithout limitation. The United States
Supreme Court has so stated on numerous occasions. See,
for example, Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954),
wherein the Supreme Court said:
"The power of Congress to dispose of any
kind of property belonging to the United States 'is
vested in Congress 'vithout li1nitation.' United
States v. 1lfi.d1vest Oil Conlpa ny, 236 U.S. 459, 47 4:
'For it must be borne in n1ind that Congress not
only· has a legislative po\ver over the public domain, but it also exercises the powers of the proprietor therein.' Congress 'may deal with such
lands precisely as a private individual may deal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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with his farming property. It may sell or withhold
them from sale.' Canzfield v. lJnited Stales, 1()7
L1.S. 524; Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 536.
l .T nited Staf.es v. San Francisco, 310 lJ.S. 16, 29-30:
··Article 4, Section 3, Cl. 2 of the Constitution provides that 'The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory and other Property
belonging to the United States.' The power over
the public land thus entrusted to Congress is \vithout limitations. And it is not for the courts to
say how that trust shall be administered. That
is for Congress to determine.' Un~te.d States v.
Caifornia, 332 1T.S. 19, 27: 'We have said that the
constitutional power of Congress (under Article
IV, Sec. 3, Cl. 2) is without limitation. United
States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29-30.'"
4

Thus, before the State of Utah or the general public may obtain "rights" in federally owned land, there
must be some legislative enactment by Congress permitting the acquisition of the rights. In Utah Power &
Light Co. v. Tlnited States, 243 U.S. 389, 403 (1917),
the Court noted the property clause of the United States
Constitution, and said:
"Repeated decisions of this court have gone
upon the theory that the po\ver of Congress is
exclusive and that only through its exercise in
some fonn can rights in lands belonging to the
1Jnited States be acquired." (Emphasis added.)
This power to release, create or otherwise dispose
of" rights" in property of the United States \vhich is thus
vested in Congress and which must be exercised in some
form by Congres~, ran not be exercised by subordinate
officer~ of the l~nited State~~ unless the po,ver has been
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delegated to them by Congress. Again, the United States
Supreme Court has expressly so stated:
''Power to release or otherwise dispose of
the rights and property of the United States is
lodged in the Congress by the Constitution, Art.
4, Sec. 3, ·Clause 2. Subordinate officers of the
United States are 'vithout power save only as it
has been conferred upon them." Royal Indemnity
Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941).
The stipulation of facts indicates that the State has,
at the request of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, patrolled the highway. (Para. 9, Findings.) But this is not
the same thing as recognizing public rights in the land.
As the United States Supreme Court has noted:
". . . True, for many purposes a State has
civil and criminal jurisdiction over lands within
its limits belonging to the United States, but this
jurisdiction does not extend to any matter that
is not consistent with full power in the United
States to protect its lands, to control their use and
to prescribe in what manner others may acquire
rights in them.... " Utah Pou·er & Light Co. v.
United States, 2-!3 U.S. 389, 403 (1917).
Accord: McKel'cey v. UnUed States, 260 lT.S. 353
(1922); Canzfield v. United States, 167 l:.s. 518 (1897);
Light v. [!nited States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911); and Gibson
v. Choutea1t, 13 ''Tall. 92 (1872).
Insofar as our rP~earch has disclosed, there are only
two Congressional enact1nents 'Yhich n1ight have applcation here. The first is Section 525, Title 16, lT nited States
Code, which concerns the creation of rights-of-,vay for
roads on national forest lands. The other is Section 932,
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rritle -l-~~' {JnitP{l ~tatPS (~ode, whieh is a federal offer of
a ri~ht-of-\vay for roads to the general public, but it applies only to lands •'not reservt>d for public uses." 'Ve
"·ill analyze both of these sections, but it i:s clear that any
dedication of the access road to public use must be derived from authority granted by Congress.
(b) Section 525, Title 16, U.S.C., Concerning Rights-ofWay for Roads on N aional Forest Lands has not been Complied
With.

The only relevant power granted by ·Congress to the
executive branch to dispose of lands or create rights-of\vay on national forest land is found in Section 525,
Title 16, United Stat~es Code. It provides:
"In the form provided by existing la\v, the
Secretary of the Interior may file and approve
surveys and plats of any right-of-way for a wagon
road, railroad, or other highway over and across
any national forest, when in his judgment the
public interests will not be injuriously affected
thereby."
The United States Supreme Court has said that the
Secretary of the Interior, to satisfy the statute, must
1nake a special determination to the effect that the public
interests \Yill not be injuriously affected. Chicago Mil.
& St. P. Ry. v. u~nited States, 244 U.S. 351 (1917). See
also Sec. 2-!4.10 and 2-!4.1-l- (a and b), Code of Federal
Regulations. This determination is personal to the Secretary and Inay not be usurped by or delegated to some
subordinate officer. ( lr ol. 39, Opinions of the Attorney
General of the United States 373; Vol. 38, Opini·ons of
the Attorney General of the United States, 474; Royal
Indemnity Co. v. []nited States, 313 U.S. 289 (19-41).
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No attempt has been made by the Secretary of the
Interior or by any subordinate officer to dedicate the
access road under Section 525. Quite to the contrary,
paragraph 14 of the Findings of Fact recites that there
has been no:
'' . . official dedication of the access road as
a public highway by the United States of America
or any agency or subdivision thereof; nor has
there been any official grant or conveyance of any
highway or right-of-way from the United States
or any of its agencies or political subdivisions to
the State of Utah or any of its political subdivisions."
It is thus respectfully subnutted that the public has
not acquired any rights in the federal lands which are
within the national forest reserve.
(c) There has been no Establishment of a Right in the
Public to use the Road under the Authority of -Section 932, Title
43.

The general statute under \vhich Congress has granted rights-of-way across open public domain is Section
932, Title 32, U.S.C. This statute has been construed
consistently as an offer of a right-of-,vay by the United
States \v·hich can be accepted by the public or by the
state in any manner \Yhirh is sufficient to otherwise establish a right-of-,yay under the la"T of the particular
state. See, for exa1nplP, ·v· olu1ne 73, ·C.J.S., Public Lands,
Section 85; 0-Sullirau r. Rro1rn, 171 Fed. 2d 199 (19:lS).
There are t\Yo eoneluHiYe reason8 "·by the construction, main tenanre and U8~ of the arre~s road \Yill not
constitute an aret\ptance of the federal offer under that
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statute. First, the statute by its express terms does not
apply to withdra\vn or reserved federal lands. /( orf v.
Ittcn, 169 Pac. 14H (Colo.) (1917); Stofferan v. Olcanog.an C ottnty, 136 Pac. 484 (Wash.) ( 1913).
Secondly, it iH clear that the federal offer for highway rights-of-way must be accepted in the 1nanner provided for by state law, and in the State of Utah the offer
can only be accepted by official dedication ( \Vhich \ve do
not have here) (see Para. 6 of Findings), or by continuous use for a period of ten years. In this regard, Section
27-1-2, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
" ... a high,vay shall be deemed and taken as
dedicated, and abandoned to the use of the public,
when it has been continuously· and uninterruptedly
used as a public thoroughfare, for a period of ten
years."
This Court has held that the federal offer may be
accepted by the public in such a manner (ten years of
use) without formal action by public authorities :
"It has been held by numerous courts that the
grant [Section 932] may be accepted by public
use without formal action by public authorities,
and that the continued use of the road by the public for such length of time and under such circumstances as to clearly indicate an intention on the
part of the public to accept the grant is sufficient."
Lindsay Land .and Livestock Co. v. Churnos, 75
l 1 tah 384, 285 Pac. 646 (1929).
But, this Court has also given effect to the clear
mandate of the Utah Statute, which requires a ten-year
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period of use before the public can establish any right
of use:
"Under this statute (Section 27-1-2) the highway, even though it be over privately owned
ground will be deemed dedicated or abandoned
to the public use when the public has continuously
u.sed i·t as a thoronghfar·e for a period of 10 years,
but such use rnust be by the public. Use under
private right is not sufficient. If the thoroughfare
is laid out or used as a private way, its use, however long, as a private "\vay, does not make it a
public way; and the mere fact that the public
also makes use of it, without objection from the
owner of the land, will not make it a public "\vay.
. . ." Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 Pac. 1127
( 1960). (Emphasis added.)
This is in complete accord with Elliott, whose work
on Roads and Streets has often been quoted by this
Court. Typical statements from Elliott are quoted belo"r:

"A private way may, doubtless, be transformed into a public one but in order that this
may result without legal proceedings it must appear that the owner fully consented to the change,
or there must be some element of estoppel to
deprive him of his rights as the o"rner of the fee.
Where a "\vay is laid out as a private "~ay, the
mere fact that the publie also make use of it 'vithout objection fron1 the O\vner 'viii not 1nake it a
public \Yay.'' Elliott, Roads and Streets, 4th Ed.,
Sec. 4.
'~Whether

a private \Yay is transfarmed into
a public one 1nust generally be determined on the
facts of the particular ea8e. The fact that the "\vay
has been a private 'vay does not prevent the public
fro1n gaining a right h~T prescription, but it may
1nake it neef1ssar~~ to exa1nine "\vith care the alleged
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public usP. '' Elliott, Roads and Streets, 4th Ed.,
Sec. 5.
Hit is generally held, however, that where the
\vay is originally laid out and used merely as a
private way for the use of the landowner, its use
by the public as "\veil does not necessarily make
it a highway, especially if the owner keeps it up
and the public use is not clearly hostile, or under
claim that it is public for the statutory period."
Elli'Ott, Roads and Streets, 4th Ed., Sec. 6.
The access road has not been used for tPn years under circumstances satisfying the statute, but has only
been used for approximately three years, and this has
been on a permissive basis:
·~The

United States Bureau of Reclamation
has indicated that it intends to permit the public
to use the road until 1962 or 1963, when certain
portions of the access road \vill be innundated as
a result of impounding water behind Flan1ing
Gorge Dam. The access road has no'v been used
by the general public for approximately three
years.'' (Para. 12, Findings of Fact).
Thu~,

there has been no dedication by continuous
public use because (a) the statutory period of ten years
has not been satisfied, (b) the use has been permissive
and could not establi~h a dedication however long continued, and (c) the public lands involved are reserved
and 'vithdra"\\·n and are therefore exempt from the statutory offer (Sec. 932).
(d) The Contract Executed by the Bureau of Reclamation
with Petitioner did not have the Effect of Granting to the Public
Rights in Federal Land.
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The contract provisions bet\veen the Bureau of Reclamation and this petitioner could not have had the
effect of granting to the public any "rights" in federal
land. The power to grant or 'vithhold rights in federal
land is by Article \i'I, Sec. 3 of the United States Constitution vested in Congress. As is de1nonstrated by the
above authorities, the power of Congress to grant or
withhold rights in federal land is almost without limitation, and rights cannot be obtained in federal land except
by authority of Congress through its own enactments or
through its express delegation of authority to federal
agencies (See page 15 of this brief). There is no federal statute granting to the lTnited States Bureau of
Reclamation the power to dedicate highways across forest
lands. On forest lands, as we have argued above, the procedure for granting a right-of-,vay for roads is governed
by Section 525, Title 16, U.S.C. It is stipulated (para. 14
of Findings of Fact) that there has been no dedication
by any official act of any federal agency. And Section
932, Title 43, by its express terms does not apply to withdrawn lands. There is a clearly established method for
the state or publie to acquire rights for a road on withdrawn lands. It is prescribed by 43 Code of Federal Regulations, Sec. 2-!4.59.
It 1night be 'Yell before diseussing this procedure to
note the statutor~T po"Ter under \\Thich lands may be
withdrawn for recla1nation purpose~. The basic statute
was enacted June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 847 ~ 43 lT.S.C. 141143). Section 1-ll provide~ that the President 1nay "\Yithdraw '' fron1 ~rttle1n0nt location, ~ale or Pntry~ any of the
public land~ ... a11d re~erve the ~a1ue for 'Yater po,yer
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::5ites, irrigation ... or other public purposes,'' and the
'vithdra,val shall rPinain in force until revoked by hi1n.
It is uniformly held that the effect of such a 'vithdra,val
is Hto sever such lands from public domain." TVilcox v.
Jackson, (1839) 13 Pet. 498, 10 L.Ed. 264.
It \vas stipulated by paragraph 6 of the findings that
these lands were so withdrawn for reclamation purposes
incident to the construction of the Flaming Gorge Dam.
When lands are so withdrawn, rights of way for highways may only be acquired in accorda~ce with Section
244.59, Title 43 of the ·Code
of Federal ~egulations. It is
..
provided therein in part as follows :

"§244.59. Procedure when reserved land is
involved; ... (a) When a right-of-way is desired
for the construction of a highway under R.S. 2-t-77,
over public land reserved for public uses, and such
reserved land is under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior, ... an application should
be 1nade in accordance 'vith § 244.3. . . .
~'(b)

Where reserved lands are· involved, no
rights to establish or construct the highway will be
acquired by reason of the filing of such application, unless and until the reservation shall have
been revoked or modified so as to permit construction of the high\vay, ~ubject to such terms and
conditions, if any, as may be deemed reasonable
and necessary for the adequate protection and
utilization of the· reserve."
Even the state or political subdivisions must file see Sec. 244.3, C.F .R.
The stipulation here that there has been no official
act of the federal government or any of its agencies
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demonstrates that as to these lands which are reserved
there simply can not be any ''right" acquired by the public in these lands. The federal govern1nent has permitted
the public to use the land, but the use is permissive. It
is not a use "as a matter of right," as is required by
our Utah statute in question, ( 41-1-19, U.C.A. 1953). Thus,
the making of a contract with the petitioner to build the
Flaming Gorge Dam, and as an incident thereof, to complete the construction of and maintain this access road,
does not follow the prescribed procedure for the establishment of a right-of-,vay for a road on reserved lands,
and the parties have stipulated that there is no official
dedication by any federal agency.
The second reason why the contract between the Bureau of Reclamation and this petitioner would not have
the effect of granting rights in the federal land is that
the contract provisions do not by their terms even purport to have this effect. To the contrary, the construction
contract merely provides that the access road may be
used by the contractor in the construction of the dan1,
and that:
'' ... the contractor's use of the road shall not
infringe on or in1peril free public use of the road
for normal traYel purpose~." (I>aragraph 7, Findings) (Paragraph -!Oa, Ex. A, the Contract.)
The contract then

recite~ Pxpres~J~~

that:

'"The acee~s road i~ ou·ned by the govern1nent
and is aYailable for the n~e of the contractor in
perfor1ning thP \\~ork required by these specifications.'' (Paragraph -t-S. Ex . .t\) ( emphasi ~ added).
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Thus, the contract, \vhile requiring the contractor
not to interfere ,,·ith the perrnissive use by the public,
expressly reeites that the road is ~' ow·ned" hy the United
States, that it is available for "use'' by the contractor,
\vith the perrnission of the United States, \vhile the contractor is ~~perforn1ing the work," and the public may
use the road for normal purposes, but no "right" is ackno,vledge in the contractor, or the public, or in the State
of l Ttah, or in anyone ·else. The contract explicitly says
that the road is "otoned" by the United States. Certainly this language - even if a contract such as this
could legally have that effect - is not a dedication of
the roadway, nor a relinquishment of rights of federal
o\vnership.
In fact, the very purpose for withdrawing the land
from public entry under the reclamation withdrawal is
to protect the government's interest in the land against
private entry. This was necessary, or at least desired,
so that the government could carry into fulfillment the
purpose for \vhich the land \Vas withdrawn, to-\vit, the
building of the dam and the inundation of much of the
land. It \vould be incredible to assume under the stipulated facts of this case that the United States would dedicate the access road to public use and thereby grant to
the public the use of the road "as a matter of right."
The only purpose for constructing the access road was
to make it possible to build the Flaming Gorge Dam.
In planning the route for the access road, the United
States knew that in 1962 or 1963 :
~ '.

. . certain portions of the access road will
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hind Flaming Gorge Dam (as shown on Exhibit
B)." (Paragraph 12, Findings.)
Reason dictates that the United States would not
dedicate the access road to public use and thereby create
in the public rights which certainly must be destroyed
within a few years when parts of the road are inundated.
To prevent the creation of a public road \\Thich could be
used "as a matter of right" and to prevent all other entries, the land was withdra,vn - severed from the public
domain - and rights could only be acquired therein by
following the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations quoted above.
The contract reciting that the road is '"owned" by
the lTnited States and is ''available" for use by the contractor, who is not to interfere with normal travel by the
public, simply could not relinquish "rights" in these federal reserved or withdrawn lands. The use is per1nissive
-not as a ''matter of right," and "\\7hen the dam is finished the road will be flooded and no one has any "right"
which would entitle him to co1nplain.
(e) Even if the Utah Statutes Defining Public Roads and
Private Roads were Applicable to Federal Land, this would not
be a Public Road within the Utah statutes.

As is noted in the Argu1nent above, Congress has the
exclusive po,ver to create rights in these lands because
they are federally o\vned. Because of this, the decisions
and statutes of t hP federal rourts are controlling. The
Utah statutes could not havP the effect of granting the
public right~ in thPsr lanrls_ hut even if they could, this
\vould not be a public road "Tithin the lTtah statutes.
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Section 41-6-18, TJ.C.A. 1953 recites:
~'Nothing

in this act shall be construed to prevent the owner of real property ~used by the public
for purposes of vehicular travel by per1nission
of the owner and not as matter of right from prohibiting such use, or from requiring other or different or additional conditions than those specified in this act, or otherwise regulating such use
as may seem best to such owner." (emphasis added)
Further, 41-6-7, U.C.A. 1953, \vhich contains several
definitions of terms used in Title 41 on ~Iotor ehicles,
states that a street or highway is:

'T

"The entire \vidth between the boundary lines
of every \vay publicly maintained when any part
thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel." (emphasis added.)
The sa1ne sectian then states that a private road is:
"Every way or place in private ownership and
nsed for vehicular travel by the owner, and those
having express or implied permission from the
owner, but not by other persons." (emphasis
added.)
In construing provisions of the Oregon Code identical
to the above quoted provisions of the Utah Code, the
Federal District Court in Oregon declared:
"The court is still of the opinion that the
rules of the road as they appear in the Uniform
Traffic Act of the State of Oregon were not intended to be, and are not applicable upon a road
constructed and maintained by the United States
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situated wholly upon lands owned by the United
States as part of the public domain. The court
is further of the opinion that the road in question
was a 'private road' as defined by the Code if it be
assumed that such a statute could by any stretch
of the irnagination be conceived applicable to a
road upon lands of ""hich the United States was
the sole proprietor although the same were \vithin
the boundaries of the state of Oregon.
"Whether or not the statutes of that State be
so construed, these were not applicable to the
present situation. The United States upon land
of which it is the proprietor has complete power
to exclude all persons therefrom, to issue special
permits to certain persons to go thereon, to construct roads and prescribe the manner in which
they shall be used, and \Yho shall use them. The
State of Oregon has no po\ver \Vhatsoever to prescribe the rules upon, or methods of use of any
such road. The right to prescribe such rules and
limit the persons licensed to use such roads upon
lands owned either b~,. private individuals or by
the Federal Government. is a part of the ownership of the soil. The lTnited States exercises this
right, not only on forest reserves~ but in military
reservations and in national parks. (citing authority)" King v. Edu·ard Hinzes Lz11nber Contpany, 68 F. Supp. 1019 (D:C. Oregon, 1946). (en1phasis added)
POINT IV.
TAX STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST
THE STATE AND IN FAVOR OF THE TAXPAYER.

If therP nrP
as to "·hether

nn~· rPn~onahle donht~

lieen~e

and

or

~nnbigui6e~

regi~tration taxe~

should be
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11nposed upon petitioner~s vehicles using the access road,
it is submitted that all doubts rnust be resolved in favor
of the taxpayer (Pacific Intermountain J~).rpress v. State
7 a.r ConZJnission, 8 Utah 2d 144, 329 P. 2d 650 (1958).
1

But petitioner contends that its vehicles used upon
the access road are so clearly exempt from registration
and license fees that there are no doubts or ambiguities.
Further, all equities in this case are in favor of petitioner
taxpayer.
The State of -utah did not contribute to the construction of the access road. It is not contributing to the maintenance of the road. Registration and license fees are
assessed for the purpose of constructing and maintaining
the public highways of the state. It is logical that they
should be exacted only on vehicles which are using the
public highways. Yet, respondent wants to impose license
and registraton fees on vehicles of petitioner which are
driven only on the access road, and never at any time
go upon the highways constructed and maintained by
the State.
\V e are not complaining because of the sums spent in
In the construction of the road or in its maintenance.
These are contractual obligations which the petitioner
agreed to perform, but we never expected to be required
to pay registration and license fees on a road not constnlcted or n1aintained by the State. We do not believe that the statute contemplates the assessment of the
registration and license fees because the access road
is not a highway within the meaning. of the statute.
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Section 41-1-19, U.C.A. 1953, imposes registration
and license fees only upon vehicles moved upon the public highways. A road, to be a highway, must be open to
the public and used by the public "as a matter of right."
It has been stipulated here that the road traverses
lands which are federally owned. Since it is federally
owned land, the federal cases are controlling. The United
States Supreme Court has held repeatedly that under
Article I,:, Section 3, Clause 2 of the lTnited States Constitution, the power of ·Congress over federal lands is
exclusive, and that Congress Inust exercise this power
in some form before rights of any kind can be acquired
therein. It has been stipulated here that there has been
no official act of dedication by any federal agency.
It also has been stipulated that the lands here involved are reserved or withdrawn lands, with part being
included in the Ashley National Forest, and the remainder having been "~ithdra\Yn for reclan1ation purposes.
The forest lands are specifically controlled by Section
525, Title 16, lT nited States Code, and there has been no
effort 1nade to con1ply \Yith the rongres~ional 1nandates
of that section. The only general rongressional authority
for acquiring rights in federal lands for roads is Section
932, Title -l-3, United State~ Code. By it~ express ter1ns,
this section does not apply to reserved or withdrawn
lands. The procedure for acquiring roads across reserved
lands is pr0~cribed by the Code of Federal Regulations,
and again, this procedure has not been followed. It
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thus is conclusively established that Congress has not relinquished any federal ownership rights in these lands,
and the public is not using the road "'as a 1natter of
right."
The contract between the petitioner and the Bureau
of Reclamation could not as a matter of law circu1nvent
these federal statutory requiren1ents, and as a matter of
fact, the contract does not purport to do so. To the
contrary, it expressly recites that the road is" owned" by
the United States, but is available for use by the contractor to build the dam. Parts of the road will be inundated \Vhen the dam is completed. Therefore, the vehicles
owned by the petitioner and primarily used to haul sand
and gravel from the agregate plant to the dam site are
not being used upon a public highway. r~ehe road is being
maintained by the petitioner, is used by it to build the
dam, and it is not a public highway. The determination
by respondent was erroneous and should, therefore, be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE & MECHAM
By: EDWARD W. CLYDE
RICHARD L. DEWSNUP
Attorneys for Petitioner
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